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ABSTRACT

In investing energy in developing reasoning machines of the future, one must abstract
away from the specific solutions to specific problems and ask what are the fundamental
research questions that should be addressed.
This paper aims to revisit some fundamental perspectives and promote new approaches
to reasoning machines and their associated form and function. Core aspects are
discussed, namely the one-mind-many-bodies metaphor as introduced in the Agent
Chameleon work. Within this metaphor the agent’s embodiment form may take many
guises with the artificial mind or agent potentially exhibiting a nomadic existence
opportunistically migrating between a myriad of instantiated embodiments.
We animate these concepts with reference to two case studies, illustrating how a
machine can have fundamentally different capabilities than a human which allows us to
exploit, rather than be constrained, by these important differences.

Keywords: Cybernetics, human machine interaction, robotics, agent systems,
anthropomorphism, philosophy of cybernetics

1. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent systems research has undertaken an arduous and evolving path over many decades, all the while delivering,
in approximately equal numbers, solutions to many problems whilst also identifying further as yet unsolved problems.
Core principles from many disciplines have influenced our perspectives on a system’s function and form, none more
so than the one-mind-one-body debate found in biological entities. The age old notion of embodiment (the strong
provision of context within the system), whether physical (Brooks 1991, Steels 2000) or social (Duffy 2000, Duffy &
Joue 2001), has been an important development in artificial intelligence research and robotics. It has focused the
control strategies employed on the robot’s environmental contexts. While fundamentally important and necessary, the
continuing focus on the narrow frame of reference of one-mind-one-body should be developed further and new
paradigms investigated, which this work aims to address.
Inevitably, our sources of inspiration come from what exists around us. Consequently significant research energies
have been invested in such projects as trying to realise a human-like robot, a system that clearly encapsulates the onemind-one-body concept. But to what extent should a machine’s reference be sourced from such biological references
as ourselves? Is the human-based approach to a singular mind-body paradigm the only tangible option? Indeed how
ought we to manage our perceptions and interpretations of artificial entities that extend beyond this paradigm?
René Descartes, referred to as the father of cybernetics due to his study of the human body as a machine, popularized
the age-old thesis that mind and body are distinct from each other (Descartes, 1637). He argues that even though he

may have a body, his true identity is that of a thinking thing alone and, indeed, his mind could exist without his body.
He argues that humans are spirits, which occupy a mechanical body, and that the essential attributes of humans are
exclusively attributes of the spirit (such as thinking, willing and conceiving), which do not involve the body at all.
While this has been considerably debated in the field of AI and robotics over recent decades, it has become generally
accepted that embodiment is key to the development of AI in machines. But what if we wanted to build artificial
systems that extend beyond this traditional paradigm? This paper draws on Descartes notion of “spirit” and extends
this to a one-mind-many-bodies paradigm.
The following sections provide firstly, a background discussion of the artificial mind and the issues surrounding
artificial intelligence and robotics with regard to the traditional paradigm of one-mind-one-body. Following this,
section 4 takes a step away from existing approaches in the context of the reasoning machine and looks at how a
“spirit” can be embraced in artificial systems with the added dimension of being able to change and “possess”
different bodies. Section 5 looks at some of the core features of artificial systems and argues how the function and
form of the machine are inextricably linked, but which are still subject to observer-based dependencies. Finally,
section 6 presents some fundamental tenants that underpin the next generation of reasoning machines.

2. THE ARTIFICIAL MIND
The relationship of the mind and body has been a psychological and philosophical problem for many years. From both
philosophical and scientific theories, the mind-body relationship can be divided into two main categories: monistic and
dualistic. Firstly, monistic theories suggest that mind and body are not independent of one another. Behaviourists
(including the likes of Aristotle, Hobbs and Hegel) hypothesised that mind was nothing more than a function of the
body. Idealists, like Berkeley, Leibniz and Schopenhauer suggested that the body was just a mental representation.
Spinoza proposed a theory of double-aspectism which postulates that mind and body are distinguishable but not
inseparable.
Secondly, dualistic theories are of the view that mind is seen as distinct from the body and not made up of any physical
substance. Some popular dualists include Descartes, Locke and James who belonged to a branch of dualism known as
interactionism. Descartes, as an interactive dualist, believed that there was a distinction between the human mind (or
soul) and the physical body, describing the mind as “[a] thing or substance whose whole essence or nature was only to
think … has no need of space nor of any material thing or body. … This mind … is entirely distinct from the body”
(Descartes, 1993). He claims that a body without a soul would be an automaton, responding to external stimuli, while a
soul without a body would have consciousness but only of innate ideas, lacking any sensory impressions (Francher,
1979). Interactionists believed that, although mind and body were of a very different nature, it was the interaction
between the two that produced many aspects of human nature.
The prevailing view in cognitive science today is that the human mind consists of distinct faculties dedicated to a
range of cognitive tasks: linguistic, social, practical, theoretical, abstract, spatial and emotional. Mental processes in
humans are generally viewed as not being solely internally-represented symbol-manipulating algorithms, and thus the
notion of a robot having a mind using the human mind as the frame of reference becomes an issue. Arguing against
artificial system having a mind is similar to discussing whether the system simply operates at a level of syntax without
semantics (i.e. a computer acting the role). Programs operating on a machine can be seen to be semantically blind,
merely mimicking the grasp of meaning according to both the rule set employed and the data received. It does not
understand the information; it merely has a methodology capable of dealing with it, a form of mapping between input
and output. Searle (1980) animates this stance in his Chinese Room Argument.
This paper argues against applying the term mind with respect to machines and makes the distinction between mind
and the artificial mind. The term artificial mind refers to an artificial entity’s reasoning mechanism, independent of
particular implementation technologies which have been developed for its interaction with both its physical and social
environments. This undoubtedly includes our worlds and therefore its interaction with us. Machines with minds may
arguably not exist, but the importance of AI is that machines with artificial minds can exist because as humans we
tend to interpret the artificial entity according to our frame of reference. That is, we basically anthropomorphise and
adopt the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987)1.

1

Consciousness is not discussed in this work although the ideas presented undoubtedly promote this discussion.

3. ROBOTICS AND AI
A predominant theme within AI research is to focus on the development of functional components and solutions to
narrow problems, with limited abstraction and consideration of the broader objectives of AI.
Artificial intelligence was initially interpreted as an attempt to prove the Physical-Symbol System Hypothesis where
“formal symbol manipulation is both a necessary and sufficient mechanism for general intelligent behaviour” (Simon,
1957). Efforts to solve the AI problem that follow this hypothesis are now termed the classical AI approach. Simon
maintained that the human cognitive system is basically a serial device.
When results were subjected to human interpretation, classical AI provided a rich source of control ideas. Problems
arose when these control paradigms were applied to robotics, and in particular the control of mobile robots. The
original theory that robots would simply provide the sensors and actuators for an artificial brain, when constructed,
became seriously flawed.
The robot Shakey (Nilsson, 1984) provided a useful calibration for classical AI and its original idea of developing
some form of artificial mind (effectively an artificial reasoning mechanism). While focused strategies to specific
solutions are essential, they generally merely provide the mechanisms upon which more complete systems can be
constructed. By reviewing achievements and failures to date within robotics and AI, an insight is acquired into the
continued relevance and attainability of the grand challenge.
Problems arose with real-time performance and stability through, for example, sensor noise and demands of
maintaining representational model validity. More elaborate models necessitated ever increasing computational effort
that often proved too cumbersome and not sufficiently responsive for real-world applications. It became apparent that
understanding system-environment interaction was fundamental in achieving robust control for autonomous robots
existing within a physical world.
This classical approach viewed mind as distinct from body and took a non-interactive dualistic approach. Early
research in the field of Artificial Intelligence worked on developing artificial minds that were effectively disembodied
with minimal interaction with any world (real or otherwise). However, this has a fundamental flaw, in that “a program
integrated in a computer with no visible appearance nor autonomous physical interaction with the real world has a
more difficult time to be viewed as intelligent, whatever the power of its problem solving and the sophistication of its
knowledge”(Steels, 2000).
The inability of such classical AI systems to handle unconstrained interaction with the real world led to a search for
new control architectures for autonomous robots. Recent research into embodiment, sociality and emotions are now
approaching the problem from a new angle. This New AI has assumed a stance similar to double-aspectism. While
mind and body are viewed by some as distinguished separate components they are not necessarily inseparable. A series
of provocative papers by Brooks (1986, 1990, 1991), argued that real world autonomous systems or embodied systems
must be studied in dealing with the problems posed by classical approaches. While not a new concept, Brooks’
popularisation of the reactive approach served as a useful catalyst in looking for more embodied approaches to
artificial cognition. Issues in real-time processing became very real, for example if the robot could not cope and it
crashed into something. Only by direct interaction could the robot gain an understanding of the environment.
For either of the deliberative or reactive approaches, a robot requires a control architecture. This architecture
determines how behaviour is generated based on signals from sensors and invoking motor responses. Reactive
approaches which aggregate large numbers of simplistic non representational reasoners have led to emergent
“intelligent” behaviour (Braintenburg, 1984; Fukuda, 1989; Kube, 1993; Lucarini, 1993). While founded in embodied
robotics, these have not proved sufficient in order to achieve complex goals and suffer from issues of repeatability and
the absence of a strong theoretical model. In contrast, deliberative architectures have displayed reflective reasoning
capabilities but may lack the responsiveness and robustness demanded by real world applications.
Thagard defines a current central hypothesis of cognitive science, the Computational-Representational Understanding
of Mind (CRUM): “Thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and
computational procedures that operate on those structures” (Thagard, 1996). While there is much speculation
regarding the validity of this statement, he continues by stating that this central hypothesis is general enough to
encompass the current theories in cognitive science including connectionism. Interestingly, while strong embodiment,
as discussed in (Brooks, 1986; Thagard, 1996; Duffy, 2000), continues to prevail as a necessary criteria for achieving
stronger notions of intelligence in artificial systems, the fundamental mechanisms used in trying to build strongly
embodied systems today are inherently symbolic in nature. The process control is achieved via symbolic computers.
So, can embodied artificial cognitive processes be really achieved to the extent required to realise a strong notion of
intelligence when our references for intelligence are based on natural systems? It’s like trying to make machines into
natural entities, or inversely, to reduce natural systems to machines, an issue regularly discussed in AI.

Two diametrically contrasting issues arise:
(1) If the reference for intelligence and the barometer for gauging degrees of intelligence is that of the human
then anything less than a human in all capacities is unsuccessful.
(2) If the qualifier artificial is emphasised, then the process of comparison becomes more of an analogy, with
limitations.
Proponents of strong AI believe that it is possible to duplicate human intelligence in artificial systems where the brain
is seen as a kind of biological machine that can be explained and duplicated in an artificial form. This mechanistic
view of the human mind argues that how people think could be revealed through an understanding of the
computational processes that govern brain characteristics and function. This would also provide an insight into how
one may realise an artificially created intelligent system with emotions and consciousness.
In contrast, advocates of weak AI believe that human intelligence can only be simulated. An artificial system may only
give the illusion of intelligence (i.e. the system exhibits those properties that are associated with being intelligent). In
adopting this weak AI stance, artificial intelligence is an oxymoron.
Having briefly reviewed the AI and robotics journey to date, we wish to pause and consider the function of the
reasoning machine, and the associated possibilities in terms of its divergent forms. In clearly distinguishing between
artificial and biological systems at a control level, this inherently draws a distinction between their capabilities. If the
system is a machine, this effectively centres its functionality on its mechanistic construction, which can be to a
designer’s advantage.

4. FUNCTION OF THE MACHINE
What is the function of the ultimate reasoning machine? With little references, our ability to invent something beyond
the capabilities of what we see around us can become difficult. Could we even understand something so different, let
alone invent it?
Robot success to date is based upon an ability to determine those tasks for which the robot is particularly apt.
Examples include assembly, repetitive pick and place, hazardous substance manipulation, welding and spray painting.
Their role as a tool is clear and their function relies and exploits the properties of machines. Given that machines have
a fundamentally different capability set, to constrain it to our capabilities is simply inappropriate. The issue becomes
what could it do that exploits its inherent functionality? At a very basic level, are the human frames of reference of
one-mind-one-body still valid in developing a reasoning machine’s functional capabilities? The following subsections
challenge the prevailing concept in the field of artificial intelligence of one-mind-one-body and exemplify the
principle of this paper which is to not become limited in one’s design and development of artificial systems.

4.1 Free the Mind
Like the rationalist tradition in philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl) AI research holds that the mind is
fundamentally rational, representational and rule-governed. Because of this, modern philosophers like Dreyfus (1972)
argue that AI research will fail because it falls prey to precisely the same issues that were directed against the
rationalist tradition in philosophy. Furthermore, an animal mind is an aggregation of a vast number of highly parallel,
asynchronous, analogue processes. In contrast, artificial intelligence to date is based on digital devices that in most
cases can only give the illusion of parallel, asynchronous behaviour. By their very nature, such devices can only ever
give an approximate illusion of (artificial) mind. So, maybe traditional philosophies of mind cannot be applied directly
to digital entities but rather should only be used as analogy. Such entities, whether a real robot or a virtual avatar for
example, can be viewed as virtual entities where it is impossible for that entity to inherently know for certain whether
their instantiated platform is a robot or an avatar. It’s a control program run on a CPU. As current AI technology is
based on digital devices, and as such all input/output and processing in an AI mind is through digital means, they do
not necessarily require a fixed platform, just as long as the platforms on which they are instantiated support these
computational entities.
It is important to note that this does not necessarily undermine the embodiment debate but rather embraces the context
of the artificial entity existing through its body instantiations in a physical and social environment. While being
physically and socially grounded is fundamental, the added dimension presented here is that the form of its body can
change. It would be incorrect to base arguments against the one-mind-many-bodies idea on embodiment arguments
that are grounded in natural systems, i.e. that in order to artificially develop a system that displays intelligence, one
must achieve the degree of system-environment integration found in natural systems. An autopoetic system is very

much distinct from an allopoietic system (Sharkey & Ziemke, 2000). The aim here is more to develop reasoning
machines rather than humanlike intelligent machines. Consequently, in using the prefix artificial, this new form of
intelligence should exploit its inherent differences to humans rather than be artificially constrained by it.
While strong embodiment prevails as a grounding in aiming to achieve an artificial notion of intelligence in its true
form, Descartes’ original proposal that mind is distinct from body rises again. By embracing functionality provided by
mechanistic solutions (“telepathy” through wireless communication), the long standing notion of one-mind-one-body
is challenged.
When applied to Artificial Intelligence, the general Cartesian model suggests that an agent has a distinct mind and
body, but yet the mind relies upon the body and the body upon the mind in order for them both to operate successfully.
It should be noted that distinctions between the physical instantiation of a body rather than using a virtual
representation are often highlighted. It is argued that such physicality is viewed as a requirement for intelligent
behaviour where its reference is our real and complex world. This is a different debate and the view adopted here is
that the physical context is always present, whether the interaction is through robot actuators or VR interaction devices
with users in the physical environment.
Within the context of the one-mind-many-bodies metaphor, an agent’s actions can be significantly enhanced:
•

Firstly, there is no restriction upon the agent’s embodiment form should take. Numerous guises may be
adopted, for example that of a physical robot, or an avatar in virtual reality or a small 2D animated gif
suitable for display on a PDA.

•

Secondly, the artificial mind or agent could migrate between a myriad of instantiated embodiments akin to
a ghost moving and possessing different bodies. The behaviour of the agent will be dictated not only by
the agent’s goals but also by the embodiment that the agent has adopted.

The choice of embodiment must not only empower the agent, but maintain the agent’s identity in the eyes of the user.
This can be achieved in a number of different ways, including:
•

Preserving key referential characteristics across the different instantiations, for example the agent’s colour
scheme or eyes.

•

Using transitions that maintain the presence of the agent throughout the transformation process.

The agent is thus unconstrained to any particular environment, physical or virtual. Opportunistic migration both
between and within different environments, physical and virtual, should exploit the functional capabilities within each.
One important platform demonstrating this de-restriction from our frame of reference is an agent within a 3D virtual
environment. Virtual Environments (VE) or Virtual Reality (VR) have a number of distinct advantages over other
forms of real world instantiations (such as robotics). Within VR, the rules of the real world, for instance gravity, need
not necessarily apply. The agent form is likewise unconstrained, as it is capable of mutation in order to suit the task at
hand, it may even choose to abandon one form of embodiment and adopt an entirely new one.
The objective is therefore to augment the artificial entity’s functionality beyond our own frame of reference. The
following case study demonstrates the one-mind-many-bodies metaphor.

4.2 CASE STUDY: Agent Chameleons
The Agent Chameleons Project (Duffy et al, 2003; O’Hare et al, 2003) strives to develop digital artificial minds that
can seamlessly travel between and within physical and digital information spaces. Three key attributes of migration,
mutation and evolution underpin this concept, and can be invoked in response to environmental change, ensuring the
survival and longevity of the agent.
The traditional concepts of agent environment and its constraints are expanded through the use of agent migration.
Agents are capable of mobility between embodiments in virtual environments (e.g. virtual avatar), embodiments in
physical environments (e.g. robot), and software environments (e.g. OS desktops, PDA’s) (see figure 1). Once
instantiated in the world, the agent has knowledge of that world, and of its capabilities therein.
Key technologies underpin such nomadic characteristics. These include white and yellow pages services for the
location of people and services respectively. Agents would thus have access to directory services that permit access to
publicly available resources and other agents. The agents would typically have a private directory for accessing
resources specific to its owner and not publicly available. These agents act as a proxy for the user in the real and
virtual worlds, as well as allowing the user remote access to their devices and public resources.

Figure 1. The Agent Chameleon spirit and its body instantiations: mobile devices (PDA), robot, PC, Web, and Virtual Reality
respectively

Furthermore, the chosen embodiment of the agent must be capable of change, of agent mutation. This is particularly
true in VR, where the agent is free of any constraints that exist in the real world. The agents must be capable of
modifying their embodiment instantiation in response to the environmental and task specific events. For instance, in an
outer space-like VR environment, the agent could adopt the persona of a rocket to allow it to fly, thereby facilitating
human interpretation. The agent must exhibit the ability to dynamically select an appropriate form with associated
functional portfolios. Additionally, the system must be extensible; it should be possible for the easy addition of new
types of embodiment instantiations for different situations.

Figure 2. The current Agent Chameleon body instantiations as robots, VR avatars, entities on PC’s and mobile devices

Alas, all platforms are not created equal (e.g. varying memory, processing power, bandwidth, display characteristics).
Consequently, these agents have to be able to adapt to different conditions. Agents need to be able to evolve their very
form. As they move from device to device they may necessarily have to shed some of their characteristics. This is
analogous to exfoliation. Upon platforms that may not be able to handle an agent in its complete form, the agent is able
to reduce elements that are non-essential to its task at hand and scale down its capabilities. Alternatively, on platforms
with minimal resources, the agent merely sends a minimally sufficient component of itself, which is required only for
its current task, while the bulk of the agent can remain dormant and dismembered on the source device. Upon task
completion, both parts reintegrate and the agent continues on its way. Furthermore, an agent can, in certain
circumstances, clone itself. Such circumstances may include those where it feels under threat, or under heavy resource
demands. This elastic evolution would empower the agent with unforeseen versatility. The form of artificial evolution
and adaptivity discussed is currently being developed within the Agent Chameleons framework
(http://chameleon.ucd.ie). These concepts resonate with initiatives such as IBM’s autonomic computing (Horn, 2001)
and that of Intel’s proactive computing (Tennenhouse, 2000). Central to such initiatives is software comprised of
confederations of autonomous and social agents which are capable of such facilities as self-healing, self-protection,
self-configuration and self-optimisation.
With regard to embodiment issues, the body is always present and the reasoning of the agent is dependent upon that
body as it provides the system with its actuator and preceptor functionality. However, the form of that body is not
constrained; the agent is capable of adjusting it or adopting an entirely new one to suit the task at hand. Each different
embodiment instantiation fundamentally changes the viewing metaphor for that agent and its associated functional
portfolio. A key result of this work is that the issues of identity and association between the user and the agent
chameleon are maintained through behavioural and visual cues as it migrates and mutates across platforms.

This work demonstrates how the traditional paradigm of one-mind-one-body can be extended beyond such a humanbased reference to one-mind-many-bodies, thereby providing new core functionality for an artificial entity. Results to
date have demonstrated the flexibility of an agent capable of migrating between platforms. Demonstrations at Media
Lab Europe to visitors were found to successfully maintain the identity of the agent across platforms whilst employing
the fundamentally different features of each as shown in figure 2 (physical mobility: Khepera robot, speech and facial
gestures: Anthropos robot head; mutation and cloning: as facilitated through the virtual reality instantiations).

5. FORM OF THE MACHINE
The previous sections have discussed the changing function of the reasoning machine. With the permeation of
computational devices in our society, the flexibility of artificial systems is changing. The next step is to look at how we
will interact with these systems, how we will interact and understand these machines.
Conflicting arguments exist for and against the human form as a frame of reference for reasoning machines and these
will continue to haunt robotics (see Duffy & Joue, 2004 for a discussion). The fundamental issue is how to achieve a
balance between the function and form of the reasoning machine. Is the entity so strongly humanoid to the extent that
we have the replicant problem as found in Philip K. Dick’s famous novel: “Do Androids dream of electric sheep?”
(1968). But, the functionality of the robot is then constrained by the human function and form. If aspects of the human
form are used judiciously to facilitate human-robot social interaction (figure 3) (Duffy, 2003), its capability set can
diversify from our own and embrace inherently mechanistic capabilities and possibilities (e.g. vision beyond human
visible spectrum, wireless communication, multi-actuator derived degrees of freedom, auditory enhancement).

Figure 3. Media Lab Europe’s “JoeRobot” at the Flutterfugue performance with SmartLab
and NYU CATLab in London 2002 (Photo courtesy of Brent Jones)

The influence of the appearance and the voice/speech of an entity on people’s judgements of another’s intelligence
have been demonstrated in experimentation. The more attractive a person, the more it facilitates others to rate the
person as having higher intelligence (Alicke et al, 1986; Borkenau, 1993). However, when given the chance to hear
the person speak, people appear to rate their intelligence more on verbal cues than on their attractiveness (Borkenau,
1993). Exploring the impact of such hypotheses to HCI, Kiesler and Goetz (2002) undertook experimentation with a
number of robots to ascertain if participants interacting with robots drew similar assessments of “intelligence”. The
experiments were based on visual, audio and audiovisual interactions. Interestingly the results showed strong
correlations with Alicke et al’s and Borkenau’s experiments with people-people judgements.
When we start to engage robots at a more complex level than our current interactions with washing machines, our
propensity to anthropomorphise becomes inevitable. The important criterion is to seek a balance between people’s
expectations and the machines capabilities (Duffy, 2003).

The following case study explores our propensity to ascribe such notions as intelligence and emotions to machines.

5.1 CASE STUDY: Emotion Machines
The work presented in (Bourke & Duffy, 2003) demonstrates the ease with which people are willing to ascribe humanlike characteristics such as emotion and intelligence to small robots performing computationally simple behaviours.
This effectively highlights how much “mind” one is willing to ascribe to an artificial entity with little or no explicit
design decisions involved.
The first stage of the experimentation involved the design and implementation of seven independent behaviours on
standard Khepera I robots as shown in figure 4 (with some equipped with the wireless communication module). These
were videotaped and a questionnaire was designed asking the observer to explain what the robots were doing, to pick
three characteristics they would associate with the robots, and to grade these characteristics. Access to this
questionnaire was distributed among a widely varied audience through Internet mailing lists. In the second stage, the
same robots were dressed using coloured felt and given aesthetic “eyes” and the same behaviours were implemented.
The same questionnaire was repeated.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4. Experiments with Kepera I robots in (a) original form, and (b) in dressed form

The results indicated that in the first set of experiments, people who took part in this experiment concentrated their
efforts on describing exactly what moves the robot was taking. Efforts were made to explain the behaviours from a
purely technical aspect, with ‘searching’ and ‘learning’ very common words used. However, it is useful to note that
people seemed to easily see past the mechanics of the robots, and began to describe them as if they possessed some
human-like qualities such as social interaction capabilities where no such explicit behaviours existed. The antenna on
one of the robots was also interpreted as corresponding to a tail a number of times and some parallels were drawn with
dog behaviour. In the second experiment, even stronger human-like features such as being ‘alive’ and ‘playful’ were
reported. One interesting example, where one robot approaches an immobile second robot, moves around it, performs
a shaking behaviour as if vying for attention, whereupon the other suddenly moves away, was explained in the context
of the observer’s interaction with their husband; on attempting to talk to him, he ignores her for a while, then just
walks away.
This work raises the question of whether a system is required to be inherently intelligent or emotional in order for it to
be interpreted as such. It is an orthogonal view of the pursuit of a system that one views as intelligent. An interesting
aspect then arises. If the system can create the illusion of being intelligent and emotional, can it be maintained over
time? Will its failing become apparent through our interaction with it? Similar to whether it appears intelligent or not,
the issue of resolution will prevail. If the fake is good enough, we won’t know the difference.
It is important to recognise Schneiderman’s arguments against anthropomorphism (1988), which state that people
employing anthropomorphism compromise in the design, leading to issues of unpredictability and vagueness. The
argument effectively distils down to a distinction as to whether one can maintain the function of the robot as a tool or
not. When actuation and perception mechanisms are employed on the system to engage with its physical and social
environment, the notion of the system remaining purely a tool becomes less manageable and consequently
anthropomorphism is unavoidable. It’s how we manage the form and consequently the anthropomorphism that
becomes the important issue (Duffy, 2003).
If we are so willing to ascribe standard social interaction frames of reference to clearly artificial systems, as
demonstrated in these and other similar experiments, we should not fear developing technologies that clearly extend
beyond our own capabilities as discussed in section 4. It is then the task of the designer to facilitate and maintain our
“bond” with new future machines.

6. THE FUTURE MACHINE
It can be more tangible and manageable to use ourselves and similar standard paradigms as frames of references in
designing artificial systems. But, as Einstein is reputed to have said, “as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality,
they are not certain; as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”. There are many fundamental distinctions
between artificial and natural systems. From time to time we need to stop, think laterally, try to free the artificial
system and allow it exploit these differences. In the future, digital personal assistants will emerge to take advantage of
their abstraction from a particular environment or platform and migrate, mutate, even clone as presented in the Agent
Chameleon work discussed earlier.
Our perception of these systems may also change. Interestingly, when experiencing “Ada - l'espace intelligent”
(Delbruck et al, 2003), a room where the user interacts with the room as much as the room interacts with the user, the
aspect of the unknown and the elemental communication with this room helped created a strong sense of intelligence.
Complexity is not necessarily the solution to creating an impression of a system being “intelligent” and this will
influence the pursuit of a system that we will view as artificially intelligent.
A number of fundamental tenants that underpin this next generation of reasoning machine are considered in the
following paragraphs. Key to these perspectives, as reinforced in the previous two case studies, are (a) the embracing
of those features and capabilities inherent to artificial systems, and (b) the management of our willingness to
anthropomorphise in our interactions with these systems.

6.1 Nomadic Agents
The Agent Chameleon work outlined previously, regarded the agent as an entity empowered with autonomy, humancomputer interaction facilities, and a fundamental mobility. The embodiment instantiation thus merely becomes the
container for a digital mind which opportunistically migrates between devices. The specifics of the hardware now
reflect the capability set of the autonomous mind. The presence of the agent moving through cyberspace, as the user
moves through physical space, allows the associated user to be available at anytime through the agent and vice versa.
Such nomadic agents also have the capacity to exploit an elastic cloning. This involves the cloning of an agent into
two or more agents for a particular task and then the “offspring” agents returning to the parent and all fusing together
as one when the task is completed. Similar to platform migration, such temporary cloning is a concept that is facilitated
through the technological advantages of software-based virtual systems, functionality with little to no basis in biology.
A clear application of such nomadic evolvable agents is that of an autonomous “intelligent” digital assistant that is
independent of any one physical device. These entities will effectively give any user their own personal assistant that
will help with the information overload in daily life, assisting with personal communications and offer a generic
interface to any number of devices. They will have the ability to react to the current needs of there user, and beyond
this, grow and learn to anticipate future needs and requirements. Perhaps our vision can be best summed up by Luc
Steels’ metaphor for what the robots of the future will be like: “[it] is related to the age-old mythological concept of
angels. Almost every culture has imagined persistent beings which help humans through their life. These beings are
ascribed cognitive powers, often beyond those of humans, and are supposed to be able to perceive and act in the real
world by materialising themselves in a bodily form at will.” He goes on to detail how Angels may “ project the idea of
someone protecting you, preventing you from making bad decisions or actions, empowering you, and defending you in
places of influence” (Steels, 2000).

6.2 A Real Fake
When the fake is so good, we won’t be able to tell the different between whether it is real or not. The Machiavellian
Intelligence Hypothesis (see Kummer, 1997 for a recent discussion) proposes that intelligence as we understand it
evolved from the social domain where social interaction between entities is key to the development of intelligence. It is
because of our developing social interaction with machines, which are becoming more and more autonomous, that our
perceptions of whether they are intelligent or not, or even how intelligent, becomes an issue.
Relative to our capability set, the idiosyncrasies of a robot embedded in our physical and social spaces equipped with
such existing systems as flawed vision, annoying speech and woefully inadequate sensor systems could be the physical
equivalent of a spam assault through chronic annoyances. They have their tragic flaws and may therefore become as
alive as we are. This also raises an interesting point about machines as “constant companions”; what are the health and
environmental drawbacks of having machines embedded in our physical and social space as autonomous entities? The
solution to these problems is to define the task, the function, for the machine. This will dictate the form, which, in
conjunction with the function, should embrace the fact that it is a machine, not confuse it.

7. CONCLUSION
The demands on machines like robots have dramatically increased during the last decades. No doubt, the film industry
has contributed greatly in moulding the imagery with which we associate the reasoning machine. Often it is presented
as a friendly, hard-working and droll creature, such as R2D2 in Star Wars (Lucas Films, 1977) and the more humanlike character of Data in the Star Trek (1987) series. Creating an artificial being based on the blueprint of humans
seems to be particularly compelling due, in part, to the basic effort of mankind to reproduce itself or even for the desire
to be immortal. However, the film industry is not satisfied with presenting the bright side of machines. It also projects
people’s fears of machines into characters like The Terminator (MGM/UA, 1984), a nearly indestructible cyborg
assassin.
This paper has sought to review and assess our perceptions of reasoning machines. Within this paper we have
reflected upon the mind-body debate and the monistic versus dualistic standpoints. We have sought to extend the onemind-one-body approach to accommodate a one-mind-many-bodies metaphor. Within this metaphor the agent’s
embodiment form may take many guises with the artificial mind or agent potentially exhibiting a nomadic existence
opportunistically migrating between a myriad of instantiated embodiments.
The choice of embodiment must, not only empower the agent, but maintain the agent’s identity in the eyes of the user.
Central to this is the need to preserve key referential characteristics across the different instantiations. The title of this
paper is intentionally not called “future intelligent machines”. It is not the aim of the ideas proposed to argue against
the necessity of embodiment in the pursuit of the artificially intelligent system, but rather to seek to take an orthogonal
perspective and, whilst employing those technologies developed in the field of AI research, realise systems with new
and fundamentally different capabilities. It is also questionable whether the term “intelligent” can be justifiably used in
the majority of AI research to date with its interpretation being rather nebulous and vague.
We postulate a new generation of reasoning machines, which evolve and demonstrate autonomic characteristics.
These machines are social (Duffy, 2000), autonomous, intentional and are equipped with rudimentary self-healing,
self-protection, self-configuration and self-optimisation capabilities (note: these capabilities are better served in
software rather than hardware – the use of software migration strategies unloads the hardware complexities required to
achieve this functionality and invariably the chances of it failing in the first place). The scale of each of these features
is primarily dependent on the complexity required and deployed, and draws on vast research to date which address
these specific issues. The agent’s sophistication is dependent on the extent of these technologies employed. The key
feature, as presented in this work, is to highlight the fundamental perspectives that future reasoning machines can
adopt.
While anthropomorphism in robotics raises issues about the taxonomic legitimacy of the classification human, and its
sole association with ourselves, the question of whether machines will ever approach human capabilities persist.
Technology is now providing robust solutions to the mechanistic problems that have constrained robot development
thus far, thereby allowing robots to permeate all areas of society from work to leisure. The key is to take advantage of
these reasoning machines and their capabilities rather than constrain them. We just keep in mind something like
Asimov’s Laws of Robotics (1994), and remember where the OFF button is.
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